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his wife shall decease" refer to their death at any time, either before or
after the death of testatrix. Demurrer was sustained.
Held, affirmed. Ratcliffe v. Kreigh, 170 N. E. 354, - App. -.
The Appellate Court relied upon two rules of construction: First, that
if it is possible to do so, a will will be construed so as to vest the entire
estate at the time of testator's death. Second, that a devise over upon
the first taker's death will be construed to mean such death within the
lifetime of testator.
The first rule of construction is elementary. The second one has been
relied upon by the Indiana courts many times, and it may be said that the
Appellate Court had ample authority for its position on this point. Fowler
v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248; Alfred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542.
However, the Appellate Court has in the past taken the position that
the rule is merely one of construction, and that slight evidence from the
language of the will is sufficient to defeat the rule. Vaubel v. Lang, 81
App. 432. The better opinion seems to be that the rule of construction
will yield in all cases to a different intention fairly taken from the entire
will. Tiffany, Real Property, 2d Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 166.
It seems to us that in the present case, the general testamentary
scheme, as gathered from the whole will, was to give a life estate only to
the son-in-law Champer; that the court should not have applied the above
rule of construction in this case. The testatrix made three principal dis-
positions. The first was a $1,000 bequest to appellant and to the negro
servant. The second was of the house, which was given to the appellant
and the servant, but with the careful provision that upon the death of the
servant the property was to go to appellant "and her heirs forever." The
third disposition (which is in dispute) creates three shares, one to ap-
pellant, one to Champer, and one to the servant. Testatrix then provided
that if appellant should die, her heirs should receive her share; if Champer
and his wife should die, then appellant to take his share "or her heirs if
she be not living." Then the testatrix proceeds to qualify the gift of the
share to the servant by providing for a remainder after his death to
appellant "and her heirs forever." In no instance except where applying
to the appellant, does the testatrix use the words "heirs" or similar lan-
guage. It would seem, from the relationship of the parties, from the evi-
dent desire of testatrix to reward the appellant for "her care and con-
sideration to me in my declining years," and from the fact that each gift
to another person ends up with a remainder to the appellant, that testatrix
intended that all the property should eventually come into the possession
of the appellant. The condition of the gift over is "if . . . Champer
and his wife shall decease." It could hardly be said that the testatrix con-
templated the death of both Champer and his wife before her own.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has in the past apparently taken the
position that the rule is to be applied without inquiring into the actual
intention of the testator. (Vol. III, Indiana Law Journal, p. 630.) Per-
haps the Appellate Court is now more in accord with that position.
C. W. W.
WmLs--Ruix IN SHELLY'S CAsE-A will provided for a farm to be
divided equally among the testator's three children. "Each third of said
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farm to be held by said three last named heirs severally. Each his own
one-third during his life time and at their death to become the property
in fee-simple of their respective heirs." The plaintiff, the son of one of
the said children, by his complaint, asserts that he is the owner in fee-
simple of one-third of the farm, subject to the life estate. There was a
demurrer to the complaint. Held: demurrer sustained. DeLawter v.
DeLawter, Appellate Court of Indiana, Jan. 8, 1930., 169 N. E. 472.
When an ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes an estate of free-
hold, and, in the same gift or conveyance, an estate is limited to his heirs
in fee or in tail, the words "the heirs" are words of limitation of the
estate of the ancestor. This rule was recognized in the law as early as
1324. Abel's Case, Y. B. 18 Edw. 2, 577. It is known as the Rule in
Shelley's Case, so called from a famous case in Lord Coke's time. Shel-
ley's Case, 1 Coke 93. The Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of property
and not a rule of construction. Teal v. Richardson, 160 Ind. 119; Allen
v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476. That is, once it is settled that the persons to whom
the remainder is given are the heirs of the ancestor (a question of con-
struction which does not arise in this case because of the use of the ex-
press term "heirs"), then the rule of Shelley's Case is imperative. Gibson
v. Brown, 62 Ind. App. 460; MecUllen v. Sehker, 70 Ind. App. 435. There
has been a tendency in the Indiana Supreme Court, however, to modify
this view to the effect that the rule of Shelley's Case will not be allowed
to defeat the plain intention of the testator. MeMahan v. Newcomer, 82
Ind. 565; Earnhart v. Earnhart, 127 Ind. 397. The earlier cases were
much more liberal in their application of the rule than the later cases.
3 Ind. Law Journal 642. The rule was adopted in Indiana by the statute
adopting the common law. Burns' 1926, Sec. 244; Sicaloff V. Redman, 26
Ind. 251. At the present time the rule is in force in England, Canada,
Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Mary-
land, Nebraska (restricted form), North Carolina, Ohio (not applicable to
wills), Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. In all other states it
has been abolished, in practically every case by statute. J. A. B.
